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1. Introduction 
Considerable effort is being devoted to characterizing optimal policy in the 
absence of commitment by the current government with respect to policies taken by 
future governments. This is to recognize a peculiarity of actual economies that, if 
ignored, might lead to significant biases in policy design. An additional motivation is to 
avoid proposing supposedly optimal policies from which we know beforehand that the 
government will have an incentive to deviate. 
Klein, Krusell and Rios-Rull (2008) characterize the optimal time-consistent tax 
policy in an exogenous growth model with leisure and public consumption in the utility 
function. They propose a repeated game structure with successive governments, each 
one of them governing only for one period. Each government is supposed to be a 
dominant player that takes the optimal reaction of private agents as given when deciding 
the optimal policy. Ortigueira (2006) compares the results obtained under the structure 
in Klein, Krusell and Rios-Rull with those from an alternative design of the game in 
which the government and private agents make their respective decisions 
simultaneously, characterizing the behavior of the economy along the transition to the 
optimal steady-state. These two papers consider alternative fiscal structures, always 
with a single policy instrument: either a single tax levied on total income, a single tax 
on capital income or a single tax on labor income. Martin (2010) follows the same game 
structure as Klein, Krusell and Rios-Rull (2008), extending the analysis to the 
simultaneous consideration of different tax rates for capital and labor income, solving 
for the optimal time consistent choice for both fiscal instruments. A further exogenous 
growth analysis is done by Azzimonti et al. (2009), who characterize the Markovian tax 
rate raised on total income when used to finance public investment. 
However, endogenous growth considerations should be important when 
searching for the design of an optimal policy. They not only allow for a more plausible 
representation of actual economies, but also for explicitly taking into account the effect 
of fiscal policy on the rate of growth. That extension has been done by Malley et al. 
(2002), who use an endogenous growth model and solve for the time-consistent path of 
distorting income tax rates to finance both productive and consumption government 
expenditures, under an exogenous split of total spending, logarithmic preferences and 
full capital depreciation. Novales, Perez and Ruiz (2013) develop a further extension of 
the Malley et al. analysis to the consideration of an endogenously determined split of 
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government spending between consumption and investment, assuming that private 
capital has incomplete depreciation each period and that private agents have preferences 
represented by a CRRA utility function in private and public consumption. These 
extensions are very relevant, since in Malley et al. (2002) setup, the Ramsey policy is 
not subject to a time consistency problem and it coincides with the Markov perfect 
solution, a result shown by Novales, Perez, Ruiz (2013).1
In this paper we extend the analysis of Novales, Pérez and Ruiz, to include an 
elastic labor supply. We consider an endogenous growth economy with elastic labor 
supply in which the government takes decisions on public consumption and investment 
each period. The government raises revenues through income taxes, and decides which 
percentage to devote to public consumption or to investment.  
  
We first compute the analytical solution in a relatively simple environment 
similar to the one used by Malley et al. (2002), where consumers have logarithmic 
preferences that are separable across commodities and over time, and private capital 
fully depreciates each period. The novelty with respect to those authors is that we solve 
not only for the Markov-perfect tax rate but also for the time-consistent composition of 
total government expenditures, further considering an elastic labor supply. The optimal 
time-consistent policy and the resulting allocation of resources are then compared to the 
Ramsey solution.  
For the more general case with incomplete depreciation of private capital and 
CRRA preferences in private and public consumption, as well as leisure, the optimal 
fiscal policies cannot be characterized analytically. There, we numerically compute the 
three solutions. For the Markovian time-consistent policy we assume that our model 
lacks transitional dynamics, as is typical in AK-type economies like the one in this 
paper. Besides, absence of transitional dynamics has been analytically shown by 
Novales, Pérez and Ruiz (2013) in a similar economy, under an inelastic labor supply. 
Our qualitative results are similar to those in Novales, Pérez and Ruiz (2013), 
with the Markov policy placing a higher income tax and devoting a higher proportion of 
revenues to public consumption than the Ramsey optimal policy. Hence, the normative 
results suggest that the loss of welfare due to the larger fiscal pressure suffered by the 
private sector is partially mitigated by the Markov government through a direct welfare 
                                                          
1 Azzimonti et al. (2009) also show this result for an exogenous growth economy.  
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compensation by means of a larger supply of the public consumption good. The 
consequences of implementing this time consistent policy are a slightly lower working 
time and also a lower rate of growth relative to the Ramsey solution.  
The paper is organized as follows: we describe the model economy in section 2, 
characterizing section 3 the solutions to the Markov, Ramsey and Planner´s 
optimization programs. In section 4, an analytical solution is obtained under the more 
restricted assumptions on preferences and capital depreciation. Section 5 characterizes 
the optimal policies and allocations of resources under the three solution concepts, 
under a CRRA utility function and incomplete depreciation of private capital. Welfare 
analysis is developed in section 6, and section 7 concludes. 
2. The model economy 
We consider an economy with a private agent and a firm that maximizes profits 
subject to a technology that produces the single consumption commodity. We assume 
that the private agent has each period a unit of time to allocate between leisure and 
working time. The stocks of private and public capital, tk  and ,p tk , are used together 
with labour time, tl , as inputs in a production technology: 
1
,( )t t t p ty Bk l k
α α−= , where B 
is a scale parameter. The firm pays a rent t t t tr k w l+  to the private agent for the use of 
private capital and labor, solving each period the static profit optimization problem: 
{ }
1
,,
( )
t t
t t t p t t t t tk l
Max Bk l k r k w lα α−Π = − − . 
Markets for production inputs are competitive. At each point in time, input 
prices are equal to their marginal product: 
 ( ) ( ) 1, ,, , / ( ) ,t t p t t t t p tr r k k l B k l k
α
α
−
= =  (1) 
 ( ) ( ), , ,, , (1 ) / ( )t t p t t t t p t p tw w k k l B k l k k
α
α= = − . (2) 
The government uses the proceeds from income taxes to finance public 
consumption and to accumulate public capital. We denote by ηt the proportion of 
revenues used at time t to purchase public consumption, the remaining public resources 
being used to pay for public investment. The government budget constraint is 
( ),t p t t t t t tg k r k w lτ+ = + , where 
 ( ) ,t t t t t t tg r k w lη τ= +  (3) 
 ( ), (1 )p t t t t t t tk r k w lη τ= − + . (4) 
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In line with Barro (1990), and Cazzavillan (1996), it is public investment that is 
productive, since the same kp,t variable enters as an argument in the production function 
and as an expenditure component in the government budget constraint. Alternatively, 
we could think of public capital as fully depreciating each period. 
The consumer maximizes her life-time discounted aggregate utility,
0
( , , )t t t tt U c g lρ
∞
=∑ , defined over private and public consumption, ct, gt, and leisure, 1-lt, 
subject to a flat tax τt on total income. She knows the current values of τt and ηt, and 
expects future governments to follow policies 1 1 , 1( , )t t p tk kτ + + += T  and 
1 1 , 1( , )t t p tk kη + + += H , solving the problem: 
 ( )
{
( )
1
, 1 , 1, , }
, ; ; ; ; , , ( , ; ; )
t t t
t p t t t t t t t p tc k l
k k Max U c g l k kυ τ η ρυ
+
+ + = + T H T H  (5) 
0given k , taking as given all policy variables: { }, 0, , ,t t p t t tk gτ η
∞
=
and subject to the budget 
constraint, 
 [ ]1 (1 ) (1 ) ,t t t t t t t tc k k w l r kδ τ++ − − = − ⋅ + ⋅  (6) 
leading to the following optimality equations 
( )
( ) ( ) [ ]
1
1/ (1 2 )/, , 1 (1 ) (1 )
, ,
l t t t
t t t t t
c t t t
U c g l
B l k
U c g l
α
α α αατ α η τ
−
−= − − −            (7) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 1 1 1 1 1 , 1, , , , 1 1 / ( )c t t t c t t t t t t p tU c g l U c g l B k l k
α
ρ δ τ α
−
+ + + + + + +
 = − + −  
.           (8) 
 The first equation is the equality between the marginal rate of substitution 
between consumption and leisure and the after tax real wage, while the second equation 
is the Euler equation,2
From the government budget expenditure rules and the optimality conditions for 
the competitive firms we get, 
 in which we have already taken (1) into account. 
 1 1, ,( , ; , )t t p t t t t t t t p tg k k Bk l k
α α ατ η η τ − −= =G , (9) 
 1 1, ,(1 )p t t t t t p tk Bk l k
α α αη τ − −= − , (10) 
as well as the global constraint of resources: 
 ( ) ( )111 , , ,(1 ) (1 ) , ; , , ; ,t t t t p t t p t t t t p t t tk k Bk k k k k k
αα αδ τ τ η τ η
−−
+ = − + − − C ,         (11) 
                                                          
2 Along the paper we denote partial derivatives by v
FF
v
∂
≡
∂
.  
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where ( ),, ; ,t p t t tk k τ ηC  and ( ),, ; ,t p t t tk k τ η  are the consumption and working time 
decision functions that solve the Euler equation (7) and (8).    
From (9) and (10), we have: 
[ ]1/ 1/ (1 )/, (1 )p t t t t tk B l k
α α α αη τ −= −             (12) 
( )(1 )/1 1 1/ 1/ (1 )/, ,( , ; , ) 1Gt t p t t t t t t t p t t t t t tg k k Bk l k B l k
α αα α α α α α ατ η η τ η η τ−− − −= = = −        (13) 
so that the conditions for competitive equilibrium are: 
 [ ]
11
1/( , , ) (1 )(1 ) (1 ) ,
( , , )
l t t t
t t t t t
c t t t
U c l g B l k
U c l g
αα
α ααα τ η τ
−−
= − − −
l  (14) 
( )
1 1
1/
1 1 1 1 1 1( , , ) , , 1 (1 )[(1 ) ]c t t t c t t t t t t tU c l g U c l g B l
α α
αα αρ δ α τ η τ
− −
+ + + + + +
 
= − + − − 
 
.       (15) 
Substituting (12) in the technology function, output is given by  
[ ](1 )/1/ (1 )/(1 )t t t t ty B l k
α αα α αη τ − −= − .          (16) 
As a consequence of (16) and (12), in the competitive equilibrium allocation, the 
ratio of public capital to output is equal to (1 )t tη τ− , an extension of the result in Barro 
(1990). As is typical in the Barro family of AK models, the constant returns to scale in 
the cumulative factors is the source of endogenous growth in our model economy.  
Finally, in competitive equilibrium we will have 
( ) ( )( ) ( ), , , ,, ; , ; , ; ; , ; ;t p t t p t t p t t p tk k k k k k k kυ υ=T H T H T H . 
 
3. Optimal fiscal policy under an elastic labor supply 
In this section we characterize the allocations of resources that would be 
achieved in our model economy under three policy arrangements: the Markov 
equilibrium, the Ramsey equilibrium and the solution to the benevolent planner’s 
problem.  
3.1 The Markov, time-consistent optimal policy 
To characterize the Markov solution, we use the same game structure as in Klein 
et al. (2008), with successive governments that take decisions on policy variables only 
for the single period they are in office. Accordingly, the Markov government recognizes 
its inability to commit on future policies taken by the following governments.  
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In contrast, the Ramsey allocation of resources would be presumably achieved 
by a planning government that would ignore such limitation. This solution would be 
unrealistic, since a future government would have an incentive to deviate from the 
previously designed policy so that the initially conceived Ramsey allocation would 
never be achieved. 
We maintain the assumption on the availability of a production technology: 
( )1,t t p t ty Bk k l
αα −= . Consumers solve the time aggregate utility maximization problem 
subject to the constraint: ( )1 0(1 ) (1 ) ,  given t t t t t t t tk k c r k w l kδ τ+ − − + = − +  and taking 
into account policy announcements. The government raises revenues imposing a global 
tax rate on total income and distributes the proceeds between public consumption and 
investment. The government budget constraint is: ( ) ,t t t t t t p tr k w l g kτ + = + .  
The government knows that the consumption and working time decision rules of 
the household are the solutions to (7) and (8). Acting as a leader, it chooses the current 
tax rate and the split of public resources between consumption and investment, taking as 
given the policies followed by future governments and taking into account the reaction 
of the household to the policy choices, to solve the problem: 
 
( )
{
( ) ( )( ), , , ,, }
1 , 1
, , ; , , ( , ; , ), , ; ,
                               ( , )
t t
t p t t p t t t t p t t t t p t t t
t p t
V k k Max U k k k k k k
V k k
τ η
τ η τ η τ η
ρ + +
= +

C G
 [P1] 
where ( ), , 1, ; , ,  and t p t t t p t tk k k kτ η +G  are given by (13), (12) and (11), respectively. 
Proposition 1. The time consistent policy corresponding to the Markov equilibrium is 
the solution to the set of Generalized Euler Equations (GEE):  
1 11 1 (1 )1 (1 )
1
t t t t t t t t t t t t
tt
tt
c g l c g l
t tt t
t tt t
U U U U U U
yy
τ τ τ η η η
ητ
ητ
αα ττ
α ηα τ
+ + + +
=
     −− − − +− − + +      −   
C G C G
CC
 


           (17) 
and 
{ 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1
1
1
1 1
1 1
1 11 (1 )
1 (1 )
1 11 (1 )
t t t t t t
t t t t t t
t
t
t t t t t t
t
t
c g l
c k g k l k
t t
t t
c g l t
t
t
t t
t t
U U U
U U U
y
U U U y
k
y
τ τ τ
τ
τ
τ τ τ
τ
τ
ρ
ατ
α τ
δ τ
ατ
α τ
+ + + + + +
+ + + + + +
+
+
+
+
+
+ +
+ +
+ +
= + + +
  −
− − + +     
+ +
− + −
  −
− − + +     
C G
C G
C
C G
C







1 1
1
1 1
1
t t
t
k k
t
yα
α + +
+
+


  − + −  
    


C

    
(18) 
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where [ ]
11
1/ 1 1(1 ) , t
tt t t t t t
t t
y B k
αα
τα αα
τ
αη τ
ατ α
−−  −
= − = + 
 
G G



, 
1 1 1 1
1
t
t t
t t t
η
η
α α
η α η α
 − −
= − + − 
G G


, /
tk t t
k=G G , ( ),, ; ,t t p t t tk k τ η≡C C  and 
( ),, ; ,t t p t t tk k τ η≡  , ( ),, ; ,t t p t t tk k τ η≡G G .  
Proof: See Appendix 1.   
 
In what follows, we assume that preferences can be represented by the utility function, 
( )1(1 ) 1
( , , )
1
t t t
t t t
c l g
U c l g
σε θ
σ
−
− −
=
−
. Under this structure of preferences, the allocation of 
resources under the Markov equilibrium is obtained as the solution to the system made 
up by the competitive equilibrium conditions:  
[ ]
( ) ( )
11
1/
(1 ) (1 )(1 ) (1 )
1 1 1
1 1
1/
1 1 1 1
(1 )(1 ) (1 ) ,
1
1 1
                                              1 (1 )[(1 ) ] ,
t
t t t t t t
t
t t t t t t
t t t t
B k
B
αα
α αα
ε σ ε σσ θ σ σ θ σ
α α
αα α
ε α τ η τ
ρ
δ α τ η τ
−−
− −− − − −
+ + +
− −
+ + + +
= − − −
−
− = − ×
 
− + − − 
 
lC
C G C G



 

 
together with the global constraint of resources and the two Generalized Euler equations: 
[ ]
1
1/
1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )t t t t t t t tk k B k
α
ααδ τ η τ
−
+ = − + − − − C ,  
1 1
1 11 1 (1 )1 (1 )
1
t t t t t t
tt
tt
t t
t t t t t t t t
t tt t
t tt t
yy
τ τ τ η η η
ητ
ητ
θ ε θ ε
αα ττ
α ηα τ
+ − + −
− −
=
     −− − − +− − + +      −   
C G C G
C G C G
CC
  
   


  ,   
1 1 1
1 1 1
1
1
1 1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1
1
11 11 (1 )
1
1 11 (1 )
t t t
t t t
t
t
t t t
t
t
k k kt t t t t
t t t t
t t
t t
t
t t t t
t t
t t
y
y
τ τ τ
τ
τ
τ τ τ
τ
θ ε
ρ θ ε
ατ
α τ
θ ε
ατ
α τ
+ + +
+ + +
+
+
+ + + +
+
+ + + +
+ +
+ +
+ −
−
= + − +
−  − − − + +     
+ −
−
  −
− − +     
C G
C GC G
C G
C
C G
C G
 
  
 

 
 


1 1
1
1 1
1
1 1
11 (1 ) .
t t
t
t t
t k k
t t
y y
k
τ
α
δ τ
α + +
+
+ +
+
+ +


  − − + − + −  
    + 

C
C


 
This system can be written in terms of ratios of variables with respect to private capital, as: 
9 
 
 [ ]
11
1/(1 )(1 ) (1 ) ,
1
t t
t t t t
t
B
αα
α αα
ε χ
α τ η τ
−−
= − − −
−
l


 (19) 
 
( ) ( )(1 ) (1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 )1 1 1 1
1 1
1/
1 1 1 1
1 1
                                        1 (1 )[(1 ) ] ,
t t t t t t t
t t t tB
ε σ ε σσ θ σ σ θ σ σ θ σ
α α
αα α
χ φ γ ρχ φ
δ α τ η τ
− −− − − + − − −
+ + + +
− −
+ + + +
− = − ×
 
− + − − 
 
t 

 (20) 
 [ ]
1
1/1
1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ,tt t t t t t
t
k B
k
α
ααγ δ τ η τ χ
−
+
+ ≡ = − + − − −  (21) 
 1 1 ,
1 11 1 (1 )1 (1 )
1
t t t t t t
tt
tt
t t
t t t t t t t t
t tt t
t tt t
yy
τ τ τ η η η
ητ
ητ
χ φ χ φ
θ ε θ ε
χ φ χ φ
αα τ χτ χ
α ηα τ
+ − + −
− −
=
     −− − − +− − + +      −   
  
   



 (22) 
 
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1(1 )
1 1
1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1
1 1
1
1 1
11 1
1 (1 )
1
1
1 (1 )
t t t
t t t
t
t
t t t
t
t k k t kt t t t
t t t
t t t
t t
t t
t
t t t t
t t
k k
U U
y
y
τ τ τ
σ θ σ
τ
τ
τ τ τ
χ φ
ε θ
χ φχ φ
γ ρ ε θ
χ φα
τ χ
α τ
χ φ
ε θ
χ φ
τ
+ + +
+ + +
+ +− + −
+ +
+ + +
+
+ + + +
+ +
− +
−
= + − + + +
−−
− − + +
− +
−
− −
  
      
  
  
 
  
 


 
 

1 1
1
1
1
1 1
1
1 1
1
1 (1 )
1
,
t t
t
t
t
t t k k
t
t t
y
y
τ
τ
α
δ τ χ
αα
χ
α τ
+ +
+
+
+
+ +
+
+ +
−
− + − + −
−
+ +

   
             

 
 

(23) 
where / ,t t tkχ ≡ C  / , / ,C Ct t t tt tk kτ τ η ηχ χ= =  
1 1
1/ 1// (1 )t t t t t t tk B
α α
α αα αφ η η τ
− −
≡ = −G  , 
/ ,  /
t t t tt t
k kτ τ η ηφ φ= =G G , 
1 (1 ) (1 )
t t t tU
σ θ σ ε σχ φ− − −=  , [ ]
1
1/(1 )tt t t t
t
yy B
k
α
ααη τ
−
≡ = −  . 
 
3.2 The Ramsey policy 
As usual, we define the benchmark “Ramsey equilibrium” as the solution to an 
optimal-policy problem where the government can commit to future policies. The 
Ramsey optimal policy is then the solution to the problem of maximizing the time 
aggregate utility  of the household, subject to the equilibrium conditions (7), (8), (11), 
and (13) as constraints: 
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{
( )
[ ]
[ ]
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
, } 0
11
1/
1
11
1/
1 1 1 1
(1 )/1/ (1 )/
, ,
subject to :
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
1 (1 ) (1 )
, ,
1 (1 ) 1
, ,
t t
t t
t
t t t
t
t t t t t t t t
c c t t t t
l t t t
t t t t
c t t t
Max U c l g
k k B l k c
U U B l
U c g l
B l k
U c g l
τ η
αα
α αα
αα
α αα
α αα α α
ρ
δ τ η τ
ρ δ α τ η τ
τ α η τ
+
∞
=
−−
+
−−
+ + + +
− −
= − + − − −
 
= − + − − 
 
 = − − − 
∑
1 1
1/ 1/(1 ) .
t
t t t t t tg B l k
α α
α αα αη τ η
− −
= −
 [P2] 
where we have used (12) to eliminate public capital from the system. 
The Ramsey policy takes into account the optimal reactions of private agents. 
However, it is time inconsistent, since once private agents adjust their decisions to the 
announced economic policy it will be optimal for the government to change policy. Full 
analytical details for computing the Ramsey policy and the implied allocation of 
resources are provided in Appendix 2. 
 Given the complexity involved in characterizing optimal policy under lack of 
commitment, attention has often been restricted to Ramsey policies, in spite of their 
well-known limitation of assuming commitment on the part of the government. It is 
therefore important to evaluate to what extent the Markov-perfect fiscal policy differs 
from the Ramsey policy in our setup. We will perform such analysis in Section 4. 
 
3.3 The planner’s problem 
A benevolent planner who can impose lump-sum taxes would allocate resources 
so as to maximize time aggregate utility with the global constraint of resources as its 
sole restriction, thereby solving the problem, 
 
{ }1
1 (1 ) (1 )
, , , , 0
1 1
1 , ,
(1 ) 1
1
subject to:
(1 ) .
t t t pt t
t t t t
c l k k g t
t t t t p t t p t t
c l gMax
k k c g k Bk k l
σ ε σ θ σ
α α α
ρ
σ
δ
+
− − −∞
=
− −
+
− −
−
− − + + + =
∑
 [P3] 
Appendix 3 contains the analytical details of the optimal policy and the implied 
allocation of resources under the benevolent planner´s rule. We use ,t p tPt
t
g k
y
τ
+
=  as a 
measure of the size of the public sector, and 
,
P t
t
t p t
g
g k
η =
+
 for the composition of 
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public expenditures under the planner solution. Both of them will be used in the graphs 
and tables we present below. 
 
4 An analytical solution under elastic labor supply: logarithmic utility 
and full depreciation of private capital.  
Let us assume a logarithmic utility and full depreciation, 1σ δ= = . The competitive 
equilibrium conditions become: 
 [ ]
1
1/(1 )(1 ) (1 ) ,
1
t t
t t t t t
t
c l B l k
l
α
α α
ε
α τ η τ
−
= − − −
−
 (24) 
 [ ]
1
1/1
1 1 1 1(1 ) (1 ) ,t t t t t
t
c B l
c
α
α αρ τ α η τ
−
+
+ + + +
 = − −  
 (25) 
 [ ]
1
1/
1 (1 ) (1 )t t t t t t tk c B l k
α
α ατ η τ
−
+ + = − − . (26) 
 
Proposition 2. The competitive equilibrium allocations are given by, 
 
[ ]
1
1
1
1
1/
1 ( , ) ,
(1 ) 1
1(1 ) ( , ) ,
(1 ) 1
1 ,
(1 ) 1
( , ) (1 ) (1 ) .
t t t t
t t t t
t
t t t t t
k k
c k
l
where B
α
α
α
α
α
α α
αρα τ η
ε ρα α
αρα τ η
ε ρα α
α
ε ρα α
τ η τ η τ
−
+
−
−
 −
= Ω − + − 
 −
= − Ω − + − 
−
=
− + −
Ω ≡ − −  
 
Proof.- Plugging in system (24)-(26) a guess: 1 ( , )t t t tk A kτ η+ = Ω , ( , )t t t tc B kτ η= Ω , 
lt=D, for the functional form of the competitive equilibrium allocation, with A, B, and D 
being unknown constants, it is easy to show that,  
1 1
1 1 1
, (1 ) ,
(1 ) 1 (1 ) 1 (1 ) 1
.A B D
α α
α αα α α
ρα ρα
ε ρα α ε ρα α ε ρα α
− −
− − −
= = − =
− + − − + − − + −
   
      
  
 
The conditions in Proposition 2 allow us to characterize the equilibrium paths 
for { }1 0, ,t t t tk c l
∞
+ =  under a given fiscal policy { } 0,t t tτ η
∞
=
, starting from an initial stock of 
physical capital. 
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 The next propositions characterize analytically the optimal Markov and Ramsey 
policies for this economy. 
Proposition 3. i) Under full depreciation of private capital and a logarithmic utility 
function, the optimal time-consistent fiscal policy is:3
(1 )1 ,   
1
(1 ) ,   .
1 (1 )
M M
t
M M
t
t
t
α ρθτ τ
θ
αθ ρη η
α θ αρ
+
= = − ∀
+
−
= = ∀
− + −
 
 
ii) The constant values of the two policy variables under the optimal Markov policy are 
related by: 1
1
M
M
ατ
η
−
=
−
 
Proof. See Appendix 4 for the proof of i). The proof of ii) is straightforward.  
 
As we can see, under full depreciation of physical capital and logarithmic 
preferences, separable in public and private consumption, the optimal policy is the same 
as that obtained by Novales, Pérez and Ruiz (2013) for a version of this economy with 
inelastic labour supply.  
 
Proposition 4. Under full depreciation of private capital and a logarithmic utility 
function, the Ramsey fiscal policy is the same as the optimal Markov policy. 
Proof. Particularizing the system of equations in Appendix 4 for the case of complete 
depreciation of private capital and logarithmic preferences, the result is obtained after 
some tedious algebra.  
 
5. Comparing the Ramsey and Markov solutions 
For the more general case with incomplete depreciation of private capital and 
CRRA preferences in private and public consumption, as well as leisure, the optimal 
fiscal policies cannot be characterized analytically.  
It is well known that in the family of AK models, the economy lacks any 
transitional dynamics under the competitive equilibrium mechanism, as well as under 
                                                          
3 Malley et al. (2002) obtain a similar expression for the Markov perfect tax rate. Our result generalizes 
Malley et al. (2002) in two directions: by considering an endogenous labor supply and by characterizing 
the optimal value of the split of government spending in addition to the income tax rate as policy 
instruments.  
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the benevolent planner’s rule or the Ramsey solution. That is also the case for the 
Markov solution in the economy we consider when labor is supplied inelastically 
[Novales, Pérez and Ruiz (2013)].4
0, ,
t t tk k k
tχ φ= = = ∀
 Taking all this into account, to numerically compute 
the allocation of resources under this time-consistent policy we assume that the 
economy lacks transitional dynamics. As a consequence, control variables for the 
private agent and the government cannot depend on state variables, so that partial 
derivatives:  at the second Generalized Euler condition (23).  
Let us now compare the Markov and Ramsey solutions between themselves, as 
well as with the allocation of resources that would be achieved under the rule of a 
benevolent planner who can impose lump-sum taxes, as characterized in Appendix 3.  
The Markov equilibrium is obtained solving the system (19)-(23). As shown in 
Appendix 2, the solution to the Ramsey problem [P2] is characterized by a system of 10 
dynamic equations in { }1 2 3 4, , , , , , , , ,lγ χ φ η τ µ µ µ µ     that allows us to compute the 
balanced growth path for the Ramsey policy ( , )R Rτ η  as well as the implied allocation 
of resources, characterized by ( , , , )R R R Rlγ χ φ  and four multipliers { }1 2 3 4, , ,µ µ µ µ    . That 
system is made up only by control variables, with no participation of any state variable. 
Hence, in the absence of local indeterminacy of equilibrium, the only possible solution 
is that control variables stay on the balanced growth path (BGP) from the initial period, 
with no transition.  
Under incomplete depreciation of private capital, the choice of parameter values: 
0.4, 1 0.20, 0.99, 0.10, 0.573, 1.1,Bθ α ρ δ ε= − = = = = = when generating annual data 
lead to sensible properties of the Markov solution. Parameter values are standard in the 
literature for annual data except for θ , which is chosen so that the ratio of public 
consumption to private consumption for the Markov solution is in line with data for the 
postwar US economy (g/c=0.25). For instance, for 2σ = , we get a ratio of public to 
private consumption of 0.26, an annual growth rate γ =1.5%, and a gross real interest 
rate: ( )(1 )(1 )1/ 1.0314σ θργ − + ≈ . As it is standard in the endogenous growth literature, the 
value chosen for α is consistent with a broad concept of capital that includes both 
physical and human components (see Cazzavillian, 1996). The elasticity of output with 
                                                          
4 As shown in Section 4, a simpler version of our model economy, with full depreciation of capital and 
logarithmic preferences also lacks transition under the Markov time-consistent policy. 
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respect to public capital, 1-α, is in line with previous literature, although the range of 
values varies significantly across authors between the 0.03 estimated by Eberts (1986), 
and the 0.39 estimated by Aschauer (1989). 
Figure 1 shows values for the main variables in the economy under the three 
equilibrium concepts as a function of the risk aversion parameter, σ. Over the whole 
range of values considered, the optimal income tax increases with risk aversion. It 
always falls between 20% and 31%, being higher under the Markov-perfect policy than 
under the time-inconsistent Ramsey policy. The proportion of public resources devoted 
to consumption, relative to investment, is also increasing in σ, staying between 5% and 
35%. It is higher under the Markov-perfect solution than under the Ramsey policy, so 
the first mechanism assigns a lower proportion of public resources to investment. In the 
absence of commitment, the government partially compensates the higher fiscal 
pressure on the private sector by increasing the direct welfare benefit obtained from 
public consumption. 
Steady state growth is slightly higher under the Ramsey policy. Growth rates are 
large for low values of the risk aversion parameter, but they become quite realistic for 
values of σ above 1.5. As a proportion of output, private consumption is higher under 
the Ramsey policy, while public consumption is higher under the Markov policy. In 
terms of specific values, private consumption never exceeds 35% of output under either 
policy, while public consumption remains below 11% of output, both observations 
below the levels observed in actual economies. However, the public to private 
consumption ratio is around 25%, as in observed data.5
A benevolent planner raising lump-sum taxes would devote an even higher 
proportion of public resources to consumption than the Markov and Ramsey solutions, 
and the growth rate would be considerably higher than under the alternative solutions. 
 For the Markov and Ramsey 
solutions we could obtain ratios of public and private consumption to output similar to 
those in actual data, at the expense of getting income tax rates implausibly high.  
The working time choice is very similar for the Ramsey and Markov solutions 
for low risk aversion parameters, while for 2σ >  is slightly larger under the time-
consistent optimal policy. 
                                                          
5 The ratio of public to private consumption increases from 20% to 35% under the Markov rule, as sigma 
increases between 1.5 and 5.0. Under the Ramsey policy, that ratio increases from 15% to 20%. 
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That the income tax is higher under the Markov-perfect policy than under the 
Ramsey solution is consistent with the result obtained by Ortigueira (2006) in an 
exogenous growth economy under inelastic labor supply.6
Figure 2 presents results for σ = 2, and values of the relative weight of public 
consumption in the utility function, θ, between 0.2 and 1.5, the remaining parameters 
being as in Figure 1. As expected, public consumption as a share of total public 
spending increases with θ. Qualitative results stay the same, with the Markov-perfect 
policy imposing a higher income tax than the Ramsey policy and devoting a higher 
proportion of public resources to consumption. The growth rate is again higher under 
the Ramsey than under the Markov policy. 
 This result arises because the 
Markovian government cannot internalize the distortionary effects of current taxation on 
past investment, while in the Ramsey solution, the government takes fully into account 
the negative effect of the income tax on future investment. A similar argument explains 
that the Markov government devotes a higher proportion of public resources to 
consumption, which has a direct impact on current utility, to the expense of public 
investment, which would have a positive effect mainly on future utility. A lower income 
tax rate and a higher share of investment in public expenditures make the growth rate to 
be higher under the Ramsey than under the Markov solution.  
Table 1 summarizes the results by displaying a single point from Figure 1 and 
Figure 2 (a vertical section of both Figures at σ=2.0).  
Table 2 analyzes the effects of a change in α. The value of B has been chosen to 
guarantee positive growth rates under the Markov and Ramsey solutions.  
A comparison of the two panels in Table 1 shows that as public consumption 
becomes more appreciated the optimal tax rate increases, as it does the proportion of 
public resources devoted to consumption. These two changes, that are quantitatively 
important, lead to a lower rate of growth. The ratios of both types of capital to output 
remain unchanged. 
Table 2 shows that an increase in the productivity of public capital (lower α) 
leads to higher tax rates. The government detracts more aggregate resources from the 
economy and devotes a larger proportion of them to investment. Because of the increase 
                                                          
6 Even though the two results are not strictly comparable, since one of them refers to an exogenous 
growth economy and the other to an endogenous growth economy. 
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in the tax rate generated by a lower α parameter, the productivity of private capital and 
hence, the rate of growth, both decrease. 
A comparison of the left panels from Tables 1 and 2 allows us to also analyze 
the effects of an increase in ε, the weight of leisure in the utility function. A larger 
appreciation for leisure would reduce working time while reducing the proportion of 
public resources devoted to consumption. The optimal income tax rate slightly 
decreases, but the negative effect from the lower working time is more intense, so that 
the growth rate is reduced.  
Since the ratio of public capital to output is the same for the three solutions then 
the product (1 )η τ−  is also the same for the three solution concepts. This property 
implies that the ratio of private capital to output is also the same for the three solutions 
under any parameterization. The common value of (1 )η τ−  turns out to be equal to the 
elasticity of output with respect to public capital, again an extension of the result 
obtained by Barro (1990) in a model with just public capital ( 0η = ). That also explains 
the relationship (1 ) (1 )M Mτ η α− = −  that we showed for the optimal Markov policy in 
the case of logarithmic preferences and full depreciation of private capital. Now we see 
that such a relationship holds for the three equilibrium concepts in any parameterization 
of our model economy. 
The solution under lump-sum taxes leads to the largest public sector and devotes 
a lowest share of public resources to investment. Since taxes are not distortionary under 
the planner’s solution, a larger proportion of resources extracted by the public sector can 
be made compatible with a higher rate of growth. 
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Table 1. Values for the main variables under the three solution concepts. 
Effects of a change in θ 
 
 B = 0.573, σ = 2.00, θ = 0.40, 
α = 0.80, δ = 0.10, ρ = 0.99 
ε=1.1 
B = 0.573, σ = 2.00, θ = 1.00, 
α = 0.80, δ = 0.10, ρ = 0.99 
ε=1.1 
 Planner Markov Ramsey Planner Markov Ramsey 
η (%) 
τ (%) 
l (%) 
γ (%) 
c/y(%) 
g/y(%) 
kp/y 
k/y 
28.4 
27.9 
47.8 
4.47 
19.9 
7.95 
0.2 
3.61 
26.3 
27.1 
32.7 
1.51 
27.2 
7.12 
0.2 
3.97 
20.5 
25.2 
32.3 
1.65 
28.5 
5.17 
0.2 
3.98 
44.3 
35.9 
53.4 
3.75 
15.9 
15.9 
0.2 
3.51 
41.0 
33.9 
33.7 
0.79 
23.6 
13.9 
0.2 
3.94 
31.0 
29.0 
32.4 
1.07 
27.0 
9.00 
0.2 
3.98 
Note to the table: for the planner solution ,t p tPt
t
g k
y
τ
+
=  and 
,
P t
t
t p t
g
g k
η =
+
. 
 
 
Table 2. Values for the main variables under the three solution concepts. 
Effects of a change in ε and α 
 
 B = 0.573, σ = 2.00, θ = 0.40, 
α = 0.80, δ = 0.10, ρ = 0.99 
ε=1.4 
B = 0.573, σ = 2.00, θ = 0.40, 
α = 0.85, δ = 0.10, ρ = 0.99 
ε=1.4 
 Planner Markov Ramsey Planner Markov Ramsey 
η (%) 
τ (%) 
l (%) 
γ (%) 
c/y(%) 
g/y(%) 
kp/y 
k/y 
28.0 
27.8 
42.4 
4.21 
19.4 
7.76 
0.2 
3.72 
25.6 
26.9 
28.2 
1.31 
26.6 
6.87 
0.2 
4.12 
19.6 
24.9 
27.8 
1.45 
   27.8 
4.88 
0.2 
4.13 
38.4 
24.3 
31.4 
5.84 
23.4 
9.35 
0.15 
3.30 
37.3 
23.9 
21.2 
2.94 
30.3 
8.93 
0.15 
3.54 
32.6 
22.2 
21.0 
3.08 
31.4 
7.24 
0.15 
3.54 
Note to the table: for the planner solution ,t p tPt
t
g k
y
τ
+
=  and 
,
P t
t
t p t
g
g k
η =
+
. 
 Qualitative results are similar to the version of this model with inelastic labor 
supply analyzed in Novales, Perez and Ruiz (2013). In both economies, the Markov 
solution leads to a higher income tax rate and a lower proportion of public resources 
devoted to investment than the Ramsey solution. Additionally, we find that the amount 
of time devoted to work is always higher in the Markov than in the Ramsey solution, 
which compensates for a slightly lower k/y ratio, making production to be a more labor 
intensive activity. 
 
6. Welfare   
In this section we compare the levels of welfare that would arise along the 
balanced growth path under the time consistent Markov policy and under a benevolent 
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planner.7
Under a CRRA utility, welfare can be written, 
 We compute the consumption compensation as a percentage of output [as in 
Lucas (1987)] that would be needed under the Markov rule to achieve the same level of 
welfare than under the resource allocation of the planner with non-distortionary 
taxation. 
1 (1 ) (1 )
, , ,
0
1 (1 ) (1 )
,
(1 )(1 )
(1 ) 1
1
(1 )1 1   , , .
1 1 1
t i t i t it
i
t
i i t i
i
c l g
W
l
i Planner Markov
σ ε σ θ σ
σ θ σ ε σ
σ θ
ρ
σ
χ φ
σ ρ γ ρ
− − −∞
=
− − −
− +
− −
=
−
 −
= − = − − − 
∑
. 
Let {ct,i, gt,i} , i=P,M, be the optimal path for private and public consumption for 
the planner’s solution and the Markov solution, respectively, that is: 

0
, , 0
1
,t tt i i t i i i i i
k
c k kχ χ γ χ γ
=
= = = 
0
, , 0
1
, ,t tt i i t i i i i i
k
g k k i P Mφ φ γ φ γ
=
= = = = , where we have used 
the normalization 0k =1.  
The consumption compensation λ needed for the Markov solution to achieve the 
same level of welfare as under the planner’s allocation can be obtained by solving the 
following equation: 
1 1 (1 ) (1 )
, , ,
0
(1 ) (1 ) 1
,
1
t M t M t Mt
P
t
c l g
W
σ σ ε σ θ σλ
ρ
σ
− − − −∞
=
+ − −
=
−∑  
that is, 
 
1 (1 ) (1 ) 1 1 (1 ) (1 )
, ,
(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )1 1 1 1 ,
1 1 1 1 1 1
P t P P M t M M
P M
l lσ ε σ θ σ σ σ ε σ θ σ
σ θ σ θ
χ φ λ χ φ
σ ρ γ ρ σ ρ γ ρ
− − − − − − −
− + − +
   − + −
− = −   − − − − − −   
  
and finally, 
1
(1 )(1 ) 1
,
(1 )(1 )
,
(1 )11 .
1 (1 )
t PM P P
P M M t M
l
l
θ εσ θ σ
σ θ ε
ρ γ χ φλ
ρ γ χ φ
− + −
− +
−   −
+ =   − −   
   (27) 
                                                          
7 We do not consider the level of welfare under the Ramsey solution because of its time-inconsistent 
nature. 
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This compensation is translated into output units through the ratio ,
,
100 t M
t M
c
y
λ , which is 
shown in Figure 3. 
Welfare compensations in Figure 3 have been computed under the same 
parameterizations as in Tables 1 and 2. As the risk aversion parameter changes between 
1.5 and 5.0, the Markov consumption compensation falls from 35% to 4% of output. In 
particular, for σ = 2, the compensation that would be necessary to achieve the planner’s 
welfare is 14.5% of output. The decrease in consumption compensation is due to the 
decline in the value of the first factor in (27). That factor, which depends on growth 
rates, falls by 70%, from 4.15 for σ=1.5, to 1.28 when σ=5. The second factor increases 
by 51%, from 0.66 to 1.00; the third factor decreases by 5%, while the last factor 
increases by 25%. 
The consumption compensation increases with θ. For σ =2, the Markov 
consumption compensation increases from 15% to 37% of output. Again, this increase 
in the consumption compensation is mainly due to the first factor in (35), that increases 
by 66% as θ increases between θ=0.5 and θ=1.5. The factor in the ratio of public 
consumption to capital, that increases by 35%, is second in importance. The ratio of 
private consumption to capital decreases by 8%, while the leisure factor falls by 15%. 
The consumption compensation needed to achieve the level of welfare produced 
by the planner’s allocation of resources is also slightly increasing in the weight of 
leisure in the utility function. A compensation of about 11% of consumption is needed 
when ε = 0.5, increasing to 14.3% when ε = 1.5. In this case, the leisure factor in (27), 
that falls by 12%, it is almost as important as the first factor which increases by 18%. 
The other two factors increase by about 3% and are less important to explain the change 
in consumption compensation as leisure becomes more appreciated. 
By and large, the difference in growth rates is the main determinant of the 
welfare loss of the Markov solution relative to the planner’s solution, over and above 
the effects of differences in the ratios of private or public consumption to output. 
 
7. Conclusions 
We have described analytical conditions for the characterization of the optimal 
fiscal policy and the implied allocation of resources in an endogenous growth economy 
of the AK-type, in which the government can raise income taxes and split tax revenues 
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between public consumption and investment. The representative consumer has 
preferences over private and public consumption as well as on leisure time, so the labor 
supply is elastic. This work generalizes Novales, Perez and Ruiz (2013) in a version of 
this economy with inelastic labor supply. It also extends existing work on optimal time-
consistent fiscal policy by allowing for potential effects of policy on growth in an 
endogenous growth economy, as well as by endogenously determining the split of 
public resources between consumption and investment. 
We can analytically characterize the optimal time consistent fiscal policy, as well as 
the Ramsey policy in the special case of logarithmic preferences and full depreciation of 
private capital. For the more general case, with incomplete depreciation of private 
capital and CRRA preferences, there is no analytical solution. We have then 
numerically computed the optimal policy and the allocation of resources under the time-
consistent (Markov) and the Ramsey (time-inconsistent) policy regimes, assuming 
absence of transitional dynamics under the Markov rule. As a benchmark for 
comparison, we have also obtained the optimal policy and the allocation of resources 
that would arise under a benevolent planner’s rule. 
Results are qualitatively similar to those obtained by Novales, Perez and Ruiz 
(2013) under an inelastic labour supply, with the time-consistent Markov policy 
imposing a higher income tax rate and devoting a higher proportion of public resources 
to consumption, rather than to investment in public capital. 
The consumption compensation that would be needed to achieve under the time 
consistent policy the same level of welfare as under the planner’s rule is mainly due to 
the difference between the growth rates under both policy regimes. 
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Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1 
The problem solved by the government is:  
( )
{
( ) ( )( ), , , , 1 , 1, }, , ; , , ( , ; , ), , ; , ( , )t tt p t t p t t t t p t t t t p t t t t p tV k k Max U k k k k k k V k kτ η τ η τ η τ η ρ + + = + C G
where ( ), , 1, ; , ,  and t p t t t p t tk k k kτ η +G  are given by (13), (12) and (11), respectively. 
First order optimality conditions for the government’s problem 
• with respect to τ: 
1
1 1(1 ) 1 0t
t t t t t t t tc g l k t t
t t
U U U V y ττ τ τ τ
αρ τ
α τ+
   −
+ + + − + − − =        
C G C



, 
where: [ ]
11
1/ 1 1(1 ) , t
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• with respect to η: 
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The envelope condition is: 
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From the optimality conditions above we get, 
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which leads to condition (16). 
Plugging the first equation into the envelope condition we get, 
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To finally get equation (17): 
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Appendix 2. The Ramsey problem 
Under a CRRA utility, the Ramsey problem for our model economy is, 
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The Ramsey optimal policy is the solution to the utility maximization problem, 
subject to the equilibrium conditions as constraints. Under the CRRA utility function, 
the Lagrangian for the Ramsey problem becomes: 
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Taking derivatives with respect to 1, , , , ,t t t t t tc g l k τ η+  to be equal to zero, we 
obtain the optimality conditions for the Ramsey problem: 
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system of equations in stationary ratios. First, from the global constraint of resources, 
we get an expression for the growth rate: 
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while from the Euler equation for the competitive equilibrium, we get: 
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and from the set of optimality conditions above, we finally get the system of equations 
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Along the balanced growth path, the system of equations for the Ramsey 
equilibrium becomes: 
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a system of 10 equations in { }1 2 3 4, , , , , , , , ,lγ χ φ η τ µ µ µ µ     that allows us to compute the 
balanced growth path for the Ramsey policy ( , )R Rτ η  as well as the implied allocation 
of resources, characterized by ( , , , )R R R Rl γ χ φ . 
 
Appendix 3. The planner’s problem 
A benevolent planner solves the problem, 
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As a consequence, output is related to private and public capital each period by, 
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Using these relationships we obtain the rate of growth Pγ  from [A1.3], 
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From the global constraint of resources [A1.1] we have the relationship: 
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Along the balanced growth path, the rate of growth will be constant, and as a 
consequence, lt and χt will also be constant, with:  
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where the expressions for the ratios of public investment and consumption to private 
capital, ,P Pχ φ   have been obtained from [A1.2] and [A1.4]. 
For the purpose of comparison with the Markov and Ramsey equilibria, we use 
as a measure of the size of the public sector, as ,t p tPt
t
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y
τ
+
=  while for the composition 
of public expenditures we use, 
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t
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g
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Appendix 4.- Optimal Markov policy under logarithmic utility and full depreciation 
of private capital 
Proof of Proposition 3.- 
The problem solved by the government is: 
29 
 
 
{ }
[ ]1,
1
1
1
( ) Max ln ( , , ) ln ( , , ) ln ( , , ) ( )
where   ( , ) ( , , ) ( , , ),
( , , ) (1 ) ( , ) ( , , ) ,
( , , )
1
t t
t t t t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t t
t t
t t t
t
V k k k k V k
k k k k
k k k
k
τ η
α
α
α
α
τ η ε τ η θ τ η ρ
τ η τ η τ η
τ η ρα τ η τ η
η τ
τ η
τ
+
−
+
−
= + + +
= Ω −
= − Ω
= Ω
−
C G
C
         C
         G



[ ]
1
11
( , ) ( , , ) ,
1            ( , , ) ,
1 (1 )
            ( , ) (1 ) (1 ) .
t t t t t t
t t t
t t t t t
k k
k
B
α
α
α
αα
τ η τ η
ατ η
α ε ρα
τ η τ η τ
−
−
−
= =
− + −
Ω ≡ − −

 
 
where we have used the optimal labor decision rule obtained in Proposition 2. 
First order conditions for this problem are: 
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A comparison between (A4.1) and (A4.2) leads to a relationship between the 
optimal values of the tax rate and the government spending split in the Markov-perfect 
equilibrium: 
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 To examine the dynamic properties of the Markov solution, we consider the envelope 
condition : 
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which, using conditions (A4.1) and (A4.2), it can be written as, 
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Using (A4.2) and (A4.3) in (A4.4), we obtain the dynamic equation: 
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1 1 0,t t
θη η
ρ ρ+
+
− + =   (A4.5) 
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1where  
(1 )
t
t
t
ηθαη
α η
−
≡
−
 . This difference equation (A2.5) is unstable, since 1/ 1ρ > .  
Hence the only stable solution is that tη  stays constant over time, and the same 
applies to tη , that is, ,t tη η= ∀ . Then, from (A4.3) we have that t tτ τ= ∀ . Finally, 
( , , )t t tk τ ηC /kt  and ( , , )t t tk τ ηG /kt  will hold constant for all t. 
    Finally, from (A4.5) we obtain the value of η : 
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α θ αρ
−
=
− + −
,  
and using (A4.3), we obtain the Markov perfect optimal tax rate: 
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+
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Figure 1 
Values of the main variables along the balanced growth path under the three equilibrium concepts, for different degrees of risk aversion 
 
 
 
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Public resources into consumption (%)
Risk aversion
 
 
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
20
25
30
35
Income tax (%)
Risk aversion
 
 
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Working time (%)
Risk aversion
 
 
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0
5
10
15
Steady state growth rate (%)
Risk aversion
 
 
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Private consumption to output ratio (%)
Risk aversion
 
 
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Public consumption to output ratio (%)
Risk aversion
 
 
Markov
Ramsey
Planner
Markov
Ramsey
Planner
Markov
Ramsey
Planner
Markov
Ramsey
Planner
Markov
Ramsey
Planner
Markov
Ramsey
Planner
θ  = 0.40         Relative weight of public consumption in utility 
ε = 1.10          Relative weight of leisure time in utility  
α = 0.80         Elasticity of private capital in production function 
ρ = 0.99          Discount rate 
δ  = 0.10         Depreciation rate 
B  = 0.573      Productivity level  
From left to right and from above to below, the graphs display: the 
share of public resources devoted to public consumption, the optimal 
income tax rate, the number of hours devoted to work, the growth 
rate along the balanced path, and the ratios of private and public 
consumption to output. 
32 
 
Figure 2 
Values of the main variables along the balanced growth path under the three equilibrium concepts, for different values of 
the relative weight of public consumption in the utility function 
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Figure 3 
Values of the main variables along the balanced growth path under the three equilibrium concepts, for different values of 
the relative weight of leisure in the utility function 
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Figure 4 
Consumption compensations 
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